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5.1  Introduction 
The saving and wealth accumulation behavior of an economy reveal much 
about it, as they reflect preferences, incentives, institutions, and demograph- 
ics. However, there are numerous measurement and interpretation issues sur- 
rounding data on, adjusted measures of, and empirical analyses about postwar 
U.S.  saving and  wealth. It is by  now  well known, and considered conven- 
tional wisdom, that the U.S. postwar saving rate is low by international stan- 
dards and has fallen since the 1950s and 1960s. This “conventional wisdom” 
stems primarily from the traditional National Income and Product Account 
(NIPA) measures of  gross and net private and national saving in the United 
States. 
There are, however, other sources for measuring saving and reasons to be- 
lieve the NIPA  saving figures are the beginning, not  the end, of  the story. 
Serious conceptual and measurement issues, ranging from the comprehen- 
siveness of  the definition of saving to important details concerning deflators, 
as well as a host of other matters, remain unresolved. Since its inception, the 
Conference on Research on Income and Wealth has devoted a nontrivial frac- 
tion of  its efforts to dealing with these and related issues, as have numerous 
other studies in the last decade, including some of my own, conducted by and 
for the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
In the first three Conference on Research in Income and Wealth volumes, 
saving and wealth were prominent features. Issues I discuss below were dis- 
cussed even then: the treatment of capital gains and losses in the NIPA, infla- 
tion and inventory valuation adjustments, real corporate profits. In volume 1, 
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measuring national wealth, including valuation problems, government prod- 
uct; in volume 2,  capital gains and alternative definitions of saving; in volume 
3, alternative definitions and methods of  measuring saving and its compo- 
nents. The talent mobilized to work on these issues in the 1930s was impres- 
sive, and included Simon Kuznets, Raymond Goldsmith, Milton Friedman, 
Gottfried Haberler, and Solomon Fabricant, among many others. 
Since a complete review of that literature would constitute a lengthy paper 
itself, suffice it to say that a recent Conference on Research in  Income and 
Wealth was devoted to issues in measuring saving and investment. The con- 
ference volume (Lipsey and Tice 1989) contains a large number of important, 
novel, and useful papers, many of which contain partial surveys of their re- 
spective subfields within the general area of study. 
The most famous book ever written in economics, Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations, did not come by its title as a matter of coincidence. For 200 years, 
issues concerning the measurement of, positive analysis of, and normative 
prescriptions for increasing, national wealth have been an important compo- 
nent of the economics profession. 
These concerns about the economic costs and benefits of  saving also have 
an interesting and checkered history (see Klein 1986). Polonius’s advice was, 
“Neither a borrower nor a lender be.” Benjamin Franklin’s quip that “a penny 
saved is a penny earned” is perhaps the most often-quoted schoolboy maxim 
concerning the benefits of thrift, but in the middle third of this century, it gave 
way to the Keynesian notion that spending might be insufficient to support full 
employment. Keynes and the postwar stagnationists were deeply concerned 
that insufficient spending would lead to chronic and massive unemployment, 
so they argued for policies designed to soak up excess saving. While it is not 
my purpose here to present my own or a summary of other views concerning 
this Keynesian proposition, suffice it to say that the force of that argument has 
been  mitigated considerably by  recent  analytical and empirical research in 
economics, and that at best, it is a weak and temporary proposition. 
It is obvious, however, that we could save too much. In order to save more, 
we  must  forgo  current consumption.  Therefore,  individuals and  societies 
must somehow balance the benefits of increased consumption in the future 
against the cost of forgone consumption opportunities today. To  show how we 
have come full circle, the current chairman of  the Federal Reserve Board, 
Allan Greenspan, has been calling for the federal government to run a budget 
surplus on average, primarily to compensate for what he regards as a chroni- 
cally low saving rate. 
That we save too little as a nation appears to be a widespread view among 
economists. Some refer to the apparent (usually measured by the NIPA saving 
figures) historical decline in the saving rate, as well as the better aggregate 
performance of the U.S. economy in the 1950s and 1960s than subsequently. 
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economy’s performance or an effect thereof, or both, is generally left unspec- 
ified. 
Others bemoan the low  U.S.  saving rate relative to other countries. It is 
clear that saving in the United States, as conventionally measured, is below 
that of other advanced economies. While I will discuss extended measures of 
saving that suggest that the traditional measures probably overstate this differ- 
ence, it is still substantial. When I was a graduate student, it was common to 
argue that it was reasonable for the United States to have a much lower saving 
rate than other economies because we were so much richer than they, and they 
were saving rapidly to try to catch up and to finance the rebuilding of  their 
infrastructure after the devastation from World War 11  (although the fact that 
this  was  still going on  in  the  1970s  suggests convenient arguments die 
slowly). The rate of  growth of  GNP in many of  these other economies ex- 
ceeded that of  the United States and our lower saving and investment rates 
were often singled out for a nontrivial share of the blame. 
Recently, a new argument has claimed that the major problem with our low 
private and even lower national saving rate is that it falls substantially below 
our rate of net investment. The low investment rate is assumed to be one cause 
of slow productivity growth and is itself substantially below the investment 
rates of most other advanced economies. We  appear to be unwilling to see the 
investment rate fall to the still lower rate of net national saving. This leads us 
to rely on historically large imports of foreign capital to finance a substantial 
fraction of our net investment and a modest fraction of our gross investment. 
If this continues for very long, it would imply an explosive growth of  external 
debt and concomitant adjustment problems later on. 
My own view of the relationship of domestic saving and investment is that 
they are indeed eventually linked. In the short and medium run, there is no 
necessary tie between domestic investment and saving, as capital is interna- 
tionally quite mobile, at least over a modest fraction of  the saving of  any 
society. Eventually, however, an advanced economy such as the United States 
will need to finance its own domestic investment. This implies that, in the 
long run, domestic investment will be constrained by the available supply of 
private saving, an event that gives some force to the concern about an appar- 
ently low private-saving rate. 
There is thus ample reason to be concerned about the measurement, inter- 
pretation, evolution, and analysis of saving and wealth in the postwar United 
States. Saving behavior may well be linked to our long-term growth as well 
as potentially to our short-run stability. As interesting as these analytical and 
empirical issues are (see Boskin 1988 and Bernheim 1987 for a discussion of 
some of these issues), my goal here is much more modest. Having raised these 
issues, I present a brief survey of some important issues in the definition and 
measurement of  saving. I also present some selected recent results, identify 
some substantial progress made, and present some suggestions for future ave- 162  Michael J. Boskin 
nues of  research. I do not have the time or space, nor is it my comparative 
advantage given the other participants and papers in this conference and pre- 
vious conferences on income and wealth, to go into great technical detail con- 
cerning many of the issues raised. For that, the interested reader is referred to 
some references. 
To  this end, section 5.2 discusses definitions, measures, and sources of 
information concerning saving and wealth and their relationship to theories of 
saving and consumption. It briefly mentions some of the potential problems, 
such as sampling error, measurement error, and various data sources. After a 
brief  discussion of  the NIPA  saving figures, the Federal Reserve Flow  of 
Funds, household surveys, and the estate tax data, it turns to the definition of 
saving for an individual, a sector, and a nation. It discusses the Keynesian 
emphasis on short-run flows; the life cycle/permanent income view attempt- 
ing to distinguish transitory and permanent components on the one hand, or 
the need to develop household age- or cohort-specific balance sheets com- 
bined with demographic information on the other; the Ricardian equivalence 
intergenerational  altruism view that only aggregate resources matter for con- 
sumption and that the distribution of resources (conditional on the level) does 
not affect aggregate consumption and hence age-specific balance sheets would 
be beside the point. 
Various well-known conceptual problems with the NIPA  and the Flow of 
Funds are discussed, such as the failure of the NIPA to measure capital gains 
and losses, and so on. Issues such as the measurement and valuation of human 
wealth and changes therein, including the valuation of human and nonhuman 
wealth in a world of incomplete markets, appropriate deflators, inflation ad- 
justment, cost-of-living indices, and so on, are discussed. A comparison of 
the traditional NIPA  saving measures with those from the Federal Reserve 
Flow of Funds is presented, as are new, more comprehensive extentions of the 
NIPA saving data that incorporate net saving in government capital and con- 
sumer durables. These comparisons are interesting and informative, although 
I make no pretense of  delving deeply into reasons for the differences (see 
Wilson et al. 1989 for a discussion thereof). They reveal a somewhat more 
complete story concerning the evolution of  private and national saving and 
wealth than has heretofore been available. They suggest that more compre- 
hensive measures of saving reveal substantially higher net saving rates in the 
United States than those found in  the traditional NIPA  estimates, but  they 
reinforce the view that the saving rate, though higher, has fallen, as has the 
rate of wealth accumulation. 
Section 5.3 discusses aggregation and disaggregation. Various theories of 
private behavior and the nature of credit markets suggest alternative views of 
the propriety of  aggregating and  disaggregating saving and wealth data by 
sector (household, business, government), by  age, or other characteristics of 
households, by  type of  asset or liability, and so on. For example, what has 
come to be called Denison’s law has led many people to suggest that gross 163  Issues in the Measurement and Interpretation of  Saving and Wealth 
private saving is the most appropriate variable to analyze for the economy, as 
households see through the corporate veil. I have elsewhere argued that both 
the gross and net numbers should be examined and that there is little stability 
in the net private saving rate. An asymmetric information model of the capital 
market which  led to  credit rationing would  require a distinction between 
household saving and business saving, as the internal cost of funds to a firm 
would be less than external financing (see Stiglitz and Weiss  1981). Var- 
ious assets and liabilities have different liquidity, risk, expected duration, and 
so on. These may also be important for analyzing the performance of  the 
economy. 
I also make a brief reference to my  own work, with Lawrence Lau, that 
suggests the potential importance of taking extreme care in analyzing aggre- 
gation issues for U.S. saving. 
Section 5.4 turns to some specific issues. First, I turn to consumer durables 
and present augmented NIPA figures, including durable purchases as saving 
and the rental flow from the stock of durables as consumption and income. I 
also mention government capital, including government tangible capital, gov- 
ernment lending, government contingent and potential liabilities, and so on. 
Adjusted or augmented NIPA-type saving rates are also presented, including 
consumer durables and various components of government net capital forma- 
tion. A comparison is made to Japan in order to highlight the potential impor- 
tance such adjustments make in international comparisons of saving rates. 
I also discuss education and human capital, pension and  Social Security 
wealth, estimates of income and its components, revaluations of financial as- 
sets and liabilities due to interest rate changes or other factors, and inflation 
adjustment, as well as saving by Americans abroad. 
For these items, I simply raise the issues surrounding them and, including 
them in an augmented, more comprehensive measure of  saving, discuss their 
rough orders of magnitude and how they might affect the evolution of  the 
saving rate in the United States and its comparisons with other countries. 
Finally, in  section 5.5 I conclude that we  have come some distance to a 
better understanding of saving and wealth. I conclude that no single theory- 
Keynesian, permanent income, pure life cycle with no bequest motive or in- 
tergenerational altruism-is  sufficient by  itself to explain aggregate saving in 
the United States. While each of these models of saving behavior lend impor- 
tant insights and contain some elements of truth, none are sufficient by them- 
selves, and all are strongly rejected in aggregate data. 
We  have also come a substantial way  toward refining some of the adjust- 
ments to saving and wealth estimates that a more comprehensive definition of 
saving would entail, and the interpretation of these data depends heavily upon 
one’s model of the economy. No one number will be the answer to all ques- 
tions. For example, while many of the adjustments, such as that for consumer 
durables, would raise the U.S. private saving rate, there would also be a cor- 
responding entry on the investment side, and that would do nothing to redress 164  Michael J. Boskin 
the shortfall of saving relative to domestic investment that necessitates capital 
imports. We may be somewhat less anxious about the rate that Americans are 
acquiring claims to  assets,  but  other concerns remain.  Capital  gains  and 
losses, such as those in the stock market, may partly explain swings in the 
traditional NIPA  saving measures, both because consumption and saving are 
affected by changes in wealth and because of the institutional features of pen- 
sion funds, the majority of which are of the defined-benefit type in the United 
States. This in turn implies that large swings in the stock market (and/or major 
changes in interest rates) will substantially change contributions to these pen- 
sion funds and hence personal saving (Bernheim and Shoven 1988). 
My penultimate conclusion is that the United States still has a low rate of 
saving (although not nearly so low as the traditional NIPA  measure would 
reveal) and a low rate of wealth creation. We start from a high level of wealth 
but, on a per capita, or perhaps more important, per worker basis, the rate of 
wealth accumulation has  slowed substantially. While  saving in  the United 
States takes on a somewhat different composition than saving in other coun- 
tries, we are only beginning to understand not just how to measure it but also 
the implications thereof,  and the policies and other factors that  affect that 
composition. For all the advances made and the insights gained, there is still 
a substantial shortfall of national saving relative to domestic investment. 
5.2  Definitions, Measures, Sources 
The potential data on saving and  wealth come from several, potentially 
complementary, sources. The three generic types of data used are the aggre- 
gate data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), the data 
from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, and household survey data. In addi- 
tion, some information on wealth and its distribution has been derived from 
estate tax returns, usually federal but also state. The latter are particularly 
useful in dealing with a truncated sample of the upper tail of the wealth distri- 
bution. The relative advantages and disadvantages of household survey data 
with respect to the NIPA and Flow of Funds data have been discussed in detail 
in several other studies (see, e.g., Curtin, Juster, and Morgan 1989). Annual 
surveys chronically underestimate wealth and property income. While impor- 
tant advances have been made in attempting to aggregate up from household 
data, the quality, measurement error, sampling error, and other concerns are 
nontrivial. Further, to measure saving from household surveys, one would not 
generally be able to get an accurate measure of both income and total spending 
in order to get at saving by subtraction, and while surveys of saving behavior 
are more common in some other countries (e.g., the annual Family Saving 
Survey and  Family Income and  Expenditure Survey in Japan) than in  the 
United States, there are several surveys in which it is possible to analyze data 
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create balance sheets at those two points in time and to difference them to get 
a measure of saving or dissaving. 
Another issue is the gray area between the business sector and the house- 
hold sector in which substantial saving occurs-nonprofits,  trusts, pensions, 
and other vehicles that may be either excluded from household surveys or in 
which individual responses may be subject to considerable error (e.g., ac- 
crued net saving in life insurance). Important recent data from the 1983 Sur- 
vey of Consumer Finances, the 1984 Wealth Supplement to the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics, and the 1984 Wealth Supplement to the Survey of In- 
come and Program Participation are all fruitful data sources. 
Numerous other  household  surveys contain substantial  information on 
property income, and the question arises as to how to aggregate it to the pre- 
sumably more accurate national control totals such as those in the National 
Income and Product Accounts, and then to capitalize them or to translate them 
into asset values. This is most easily done for interest-bearing assets of a fixed 
duration, and much more difficult to do for other types of assets and liabilities. 
Many of the recent studies of the dissaving behavior of the elderly (e.g., Hurd 
1987; Bernheim 1984; Diamond and Hausman  1984; and others) attempt to 
make the best use possible of such household survey data. I shall say no more 
about this source of  information other than that it is an important additional 
source that can be integrated with aggregate data on the one hand, and then 
disaggregated to provide details on distributions and characteristics that may 
be of great interest. 
Before turning to NIPA and Flow of Funds saving estimates and the corre- 
sponding wealth estimates from the Flow of Funds, a few words concerning 
theories of  saving and consumption and what sorts of data are consistent or 
inconsistent with them are in order. 
The three leading theories of  saving/consumption behavior are Keynesian 
(KN) ,  life cycle/permanent income hypotheses (LCWPIH)  ,  and intergenera- 
tional altruism (IGA). The Keynesian predilection to focus on short-run cash 
flows generally ignores capital gains and losses as components of income and 
focuses on the flow of  saving out of current disposable income. In contrast, 
the permanent income hypothesis attempts to disentangle permanent from 
transitory components and has vastly different predictions concerning the re- 
sponse of saving to permanent and transitory components of income (includ- 
ing transitory components due to fiscal policy changes). It is important to note 
that the life-cycle hypothesis suggests that the marginal propensity to save 
depends upon age and that demographics are important. This leads immedi- 
ately to going beyond aggregate saving data to attempt to analyze the effects 
of  the age distribution of the population or resources on saving and suggests 
the calculation of age or cohort-specific balance sheets and saving rates may 
be quite useful in the analysis of trends in saving behavior and their responses 
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In sharp contrast to the LCH stands the strong implication of  intergenera- 
tional altruism that  aggregate consumption depends only on aggregate re- 
sources, not  on their distribution across generations. Age-specific policies 
should have no impact on aggregate consumption and national saving, as pri- 
vate saving will adjust to public saving or dissaving. The potential usefulness 
of household balance sheets and age-specific saving rates for analyzing saving 
and its reaction to policy experiments is useful only in the context of testing 
Ricardian equivalence/intergenerational altruism.  If  one accepts the strong 
tenets of Ricardian equivalence, the usefulness of the data disaggregated by 
age disappears. In Boskin and Kotlikoff (1985), we build a finite approxima- 
tion to an intergenerationally altruistic infinitely lived optimal consumption 
program and test whether the age distribution of resources affects consump- 
tion, given the aggregate level of resources. We  reject this implication of Ri- 
cardian equivalence based on postwar U.S.  time-series data. In Boskin and 
Lau (1988), we develop age- and cohort-specific balance sheets by combining 
Current Population Survey data on the age distribution of income with more 
usual aggregate variables. We estimate an economically important and statis- 
tically  significant effect of  the  age  distribution of  human  and  nonhuman 
wealth on the share of aggregate wealth consumed. We  also estimate a large, 
statistically significant generation effect: households headed by persons born 
since 1939 consume a larger share of  their wealth than those born prior to 
1939, at the same age. The strong implication of  Ricardian equivalence is 
rejected. 
Most aggregate time-series studies reject the simple Keynesian specifica- 
tion of  consumption and suggest that there is tax discounting, or at least a 
large fraction of  the population is forward looking and maximizing over a 
longer time horizon than the typical Keynesian short-run flows. For example, 
Hall and Mishkin (1982) conclude that about four-fifths of consumers could 
be modeled as if they are maximizing over a long time horizon, whereas one- 
fifth could not. 
Studies of  the dissaving behavior of the elderly have generally concluded 
that the strictest version of the LCH, an expected average propensity to con- 
sume over the lifetime of  one, is inconsistent with the observed behavior, 
although Hurd (1987) presents data that are consistent with the LCH. 
My own conclusion is that no single model of saving and consumption be- 
havior is sufficient to explain aggregate saving fully. All of  the theories are 
rejected in studies based on aggregate time-series data, and some are usually 
rejected in other studies. There appears to be substantial heterogeneity among 
consumers. This heterogeneity may be a function of age, income, and desired 
consumption profiles leading to liquidity constraints or a host of  social, psy- 
chological, environmental, historical, and economic variables. I believe that 
there is now strong evidence that the age distribution of resources, given their 
aggregate level, affects aggregate consumption, and therefore there is some 
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nal) survey data on the distribution of resources by  characteristics of house- 
holds with aggregate data. 
Saving is usually defined as forgoing current consumption and providing 
funds either directly or indirectly to capital markets to channel into productive 
investment, whether in tangible, financial, or human capital. It is a neat con- 
cept, but there are an inordinate number of difficulties in measuring it. 
Let us start with the most basic definition that saving in period t,S,, is equal 
to income minus consumption in that period, Y,  and C,. Or, 
(1) 
Hence, saving will equal investment ex post. From the Haig-Simon’s defini- 
tion of income, 
s,  = Y,  - c,. 
(2)  Y, = C, + (Wr -  Wr-1) 9 
income is the sum of consumption plus the change in net worth, the difference 
is the change in the value of assets and of liabilities. Therefore, 
(3) 
or saving equals the change in net worth. The problem in measuring saving 
(and, when we integrate saving over a period of time, wealth) stem from dif- 
ficulties in measuring Y, C, and W,  and W,- 
It is  worth  mentioning that  so prominent an  economist as Larry  Klein 
(1986) has argued that “the importance of saving tends to be understated if we 
treat it as a mere residual.” Klein emphasizes that households make genuine 
decisions about most asset and liability changes, whereas the residual concept 
was popularized from the Depression mentality as a typical representation of 
personal saving. 
First, household saving in our national accounts is estimated as a residual, 
after subtracting consumer expenditures, taxes, and interest payments to busi- 
ness from estimated personal income. The measurement errors in these com- 
ponents (each of which is potentially quite large relative to net saving), will 
show up dollar for dollar in net saving. Suppose, heroically, that we have a 
good estimate of income. Then errors in the measurement of consumption that 
may be quite small relative to consumption translate into larger percentage 
errors in the measure of saving, which is much smaller. I consider this to be a 
problem, but much less of  a problem than measuring income. Suppose we 
measure consumption properly, but mismeasure, say underestimate, income. 
Then in general, saving will be underestimated dollar for dollar. Again, I con- 
sider this to be an extremely important issue, perhaps the most important one. 
Numerous studies suggest that income is substantially underestimated in the 
national income accounts. The BEA makes an adjustment to personal income 
related, apparently, to IRS estimates of underreported adjusted gross income. 
While the range of estimates of this underestimation is substantial (see Feige 
1983), I believe it is not trivial. 
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One extreme set of estimates based on a transactions methodology (Feige 
1983)  estimates that while unrecorded income was trivial in the  1950s and 
1960s,  by the late 1970s and early 1980s it amounted to 40% of the GNP. An 
unrecorded  income which  was  primarily saved of  even one-tenth this size 
would raise the net private saving rate by SO%, from 5% to 9% of the GNP. If 
net private saving runs about $250 billion per year, and gross private saving 
about $600 or $700 billion per year, an underestimate of  income by  a few 
percentage points will  lead to a serious underestimate of  saving. A related 
problem may be the understatement of  the income earned and saving done 
abroad. 
What are the likely reasons for underestimating income? A good discussion 
of some of these issues is presented in Holloway (1989);  it includes where one 
draws the boundary in the GNP accounts (e.g., placing emphasis on market 
transactions with only a few imputations, excluding illegal activity, excluding 
capital gains, to which we will return below). Much has been made recently 
of  the underground economy, and estimates of  the size of  the underground 
economy vary by  two orders of  magnitude (see Feige  1983).  This includes 
illegal activity and activity that is deliberately unreported, usually for tax rea- 
sons, such as cash payments for services that go unreported. To  the extent 
that personal income is seriously understated, we would expect the degree of 
underreporting to be positively correlated with marginal effective tax rates. 
Barro and Sahasakul(l983)  estimate that the fraction of U.S. households sub- 
ject to high marginal tax rates quadrupled between  1965 and  1980.  While 
marginal tax rates have come down some since then, this suggests that by the 
late 1970s and early 1980s the underreporting of  personal income had prob- 
ably grown substantially. 
But  is  personal  income that  underreported? Since consumption is two- 
thirds of income, and is estimated from transactions, some of the income that 
is unreported for tax purposes does show up in transactions, eventually work- 
ing its way back into the income figures. 
Still, the net degree of  underreporting of  personal income is a source of 
some concern, especially since there is reason to believe that it has grown 
substantially over precisely the period in which there is great concern about 
the fall in the saving rate. Finally, a word should be said about international 
comparisons. Since U.S. marginal tax rates are now much lower than those in 
most other advanced economies, we would expect the degree of underreport- 
ing and the underground economy to be somewhat less in the United States 
than in these countries. But this is only conjecture, for this will reflect social 
attitudes, the nature and resources devoted to tax enforcement, and so on, and 
on this I believe we have little evidence. In any event, I believe it is a fruitful 
area for future research. As  already noted, the NIPA measure of  saving ex- 
cludes net capital gains or losses in its measure of saving, as in its measure of 
income. 
A third problem is the treatment of  expenditures on consumer durables as 169  Issues in the Measurement and Interpretation of  Saving and  Wealth 
consumption rather than as saving. Finally, the treatment of government sav- 
ing or dissaving in the U. S  . NIPA is a rather mechanical reporting of the bud- 
getary position, with no attempt to develop a separate capital account on the 
expenditure side for government units in reporting a surplus or deficit on cur- 
rent operating accounts (see Boskin 1982). The federal government’s own 
budget suffers from this difficulty, but the Department of Commerce does at- 
tempt to estimate government capital stocks, investment, and depreciation. 
We  will return to these two issues in section 5.4 below. 
Let us turn to the NIPA saving figures for the United States. Table 5.1 pre- 
sents estimates of gross and net national saving and their components in the 
United States, 1951-87.  Net saving is decomposed into private saving, the 
state and local government surplus, and the federal government surplus. Pri- 
vate saving, in turn, is decomposed into personal and corporate saving. Nu- 
merous conjectures have been made concerning whether the appropriate rate 
to study is net or gross, private or total, or disaggregated personal and corpo- 
rate saving. For example, David and Scadding (1974) find that the gross pri- 
vate saving rate at full employment is remarkably constant, reinforcing the 
finding of Denison (1958). They infer from this that households see through 
the corporate veil and that movements between personal and corporate saving 
reflect various factors such as changes in the relative tax advantages of the two 
forms of saving. However, they strongly reject the ultra-rationality argument 
that households see through the government veil, an argument associated with 
Martin Baily (1962) and Robert Barro (1974). 
Recent theoretical work on credit markets (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss  1981) 
suggests that maintaining the distinction between household and  corporate 
saving may be quite important. Asymmetric information may lead to a situa- 
Table 5.1  U.S. Gross and Net Saving, 1951-87 
1951-60  1961-70  1971-80  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
Total net saving:  7.1  7.8  7.0  5.7  2.02.04.1  2.3  1.8  1.9 
Net privatesaving:  7.5  8.2  8.0  6.6  5.5  5.7  6.8  5.7  5.3  4.3 
Personalsaving  4.7  4.8  5.5  5.2  4.9  3.8  4.4  3.2  3.1  2.7 
Corporatesaving  2.8  3.4  2.4  1.4  .6  1.9  2.5  2.5  2.2  1.7 
government sur- 
plus  -  .2  .I  .9  1.1  1.1  1.4  1.7  1.6  1.3  1.0 
State & local 
Federal govern- 
Memoranda: 
ment surplus  -.2  -.5  -1.8  -2.1  -4.6  -5.2  -4.5  -4.9  -4.8  -3.4 
capital consump- 
tion  8.7  8.4  9.8  11.4  12.1  11.6  11.0  10.9  10.8  10.7 
Grossprivatesaving  16.2  16.6  17.8  18.0  17.6  17.4  17.9  16.6  16.1  15.0 
Source; U.S. Department of Commerce, National Income and Product Accounts. 
Nores: Data are averages (except for 1981-87)  of annual flow, as percentages of GNP. 
Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. 1987 figures are preliminary. 170  Michael J. Boskin 
tion where the cost of internal funds is substantially below the cost of external 
funds, and therefore corporate cash flow may be an important separate deter- 
minant of business investment, a result consistent with investment equations 
in many large macroeconometric models. If this is the case, it may be impor- 
tant for some purposes not to aggregate private saving. 
Further, focusing on gross saving and its apparent stability-although  it has 
not been as stable through 1987-seems  odd since virtually all theories are in 
terms of how households, firms, and even governments wish to form their net 
wealth position. In brief, any rationality hypothesis seems somewhat out of 
balance if it ignores the fact that depreciation is estimable. There is much less 
stability in the net private saving rate and in the net national saving rate than 
in the corresponding gross figures. 
The most important items to note in table 5.1 are the levels of gross and net 
saving, which are low relative to that of other societies (see Blades and Sturm 
1982) and the substantial decline in the net private saving rate, and especially 
the net national saving rate in  the  1980s relative to the  1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s. These data undoubtedly form the most important basis for concern 
over the level and trend in private and national saving in the United States. 
As noted above in equation (3), saving can also be defined as the change in 
net worth. An alternative approach to measuring saving may be obtained from 
estimates of  sectoral and national net worth through time. The Federal Re- 
serve’s year-end balance sheets for the U.S.  economy provide just such a 
source of  data. Recall that the NIPA  saving and income measures exclude 
capital gains and losses. These are, in principle, captured by the Federal Re- 
serve’s balance sheets, which should also reflect some wealth accumulated in 
the underground economy. The Flow of Funds data have their own problems, 
both internally and relative to household surveys and the NIPAs (see, e.g., 
Curtin, Juster, and Morgan 1989; and Wilson et al. 1989). Among the more 
important are that bonds are carried at par (in recent years, the changes in the 
value of bonds will not necessarily net internally given the increase in foreign 
holdings), and the rudimentary treatment of the government sector in the Flow 
of  Funds-in  particular, as with the NIPA, there is no attempt to estimate 
changes in the value and the imputed income from government tangible capi- 
tal. (I ignore the even thornier problem of contingent and potential liabilities 
and intangible capital discussed below) The Flow of  Funds balance sheets, 
however, do attempt to record the current value of all assets and liabilities in 
the economy, such as owner-occupied housing, consumer durables, invento- 
ries, and depreciable plant and equipment. In principle, the FOF not only 
includes traditional gains and losses, but revaluations of real assets caused by 
depreciation, obsolescence, or other sources. For business tangible capital, 
the estimates are of the replacement cost, not the current market value. Hence, 
when Tobin’s q diverges systematically from one, the Flow of Funds data may 
over- or understate the value of tangible business capital. 
Saving can now be defined as the change in net worth. Because of inflation, 171  Issues in the Measurement and Interpretation of  Saving and Wealth 
with the net worth data as year-end figures, we need to estimate saving in 
current dollars as 
s,  = Nw, -  P,/P,-, - Nw,_, , 
where P, is an index of prices. Because these are end-of-year data. I use the 
December consumer price index. There are numerous reasons why other in- 
dices might be more appropriate, but it is much more difficult to obtain them 
on a year-end basis rather than quarterly or as an average over the year. 
The Flow of Funds also presents considerable disaggregation with respect 
to the sector (e.g., households, nonfinancial corporations, government units, 
etc.) and type of assets and liabilities. I present in table 5.2 the private, public, 
and national saving rates as a percentage of GNP from the period 1948-87. 
These data reveal some interesting differences relative to the data in table 5.1. 
While they are usually substantially higher, they vary quite a bit more, and, 
as they reflect changes in  asset values, they are even negative on occasion 
(e.g., see national saving in 1982 and 1985). Table 5.3 presents estimates on 
a decade-by-decade average basis for private, public, and national saving. The 
net private saving rate in the 1950s is more than 150%  as large as that reported 
in the NIPA. In the 1960s, it is somewhat larger, although it had fallen some- 
what relative to the 1950s. The net private saving rate from the Flow of Funds 
rebounds in the 1970s and again is more than one and one-half times that of 
the corresponding data from NIPA.  The data for the first half  of  the 1980s 
from the Flow of Funds reveals the tremendous fall in both the private saving 
rate and the national saving rate. As table 5.3 reveals, the public saving rate 
was  about zero in the 1950s, 1960s, and  1970s, as traditionally measured 
budget deficits in the 1970s were offset by accumulation of financial assets by 
the public sector. The net national saving rates, therefore, are almost identical 
with the net private saving rates and, again, are much larger than the NIPA 
numbers. Net national saving has fallen tremendously in the 1980s, as both 
net private saving has fallen and the public sector has turned into a dissaver, 
even when one accounts for its accumulation of financial assets (although not 
of tangible assets). 
Let us now turn our attention to measures of wealth and the rate of growth 
of  wealth. Table 5.4 presents estimates, derived from the Flow of Funds, of 
private, public, and national net worth in billions of constant 1982 dollars, for 
the period 1948-87.  Recall that the public sector data include only financial 
assets,not tangible assets. These data suggest that private real net worth has 
more than tripled in the period 1948-87  and that national real net worth has 
almost quadrupled in the same period. On a per capita basis, real net worth 
has about doubled. 
Table 5.5 presents estimates of the rate of growth of net worth (i.e., the rate 
of  change of  net  worth, both private and national). This reflects the rate of 
private and national saving in the numerator, including revaluations, and the 
preexisting level of net worth in the denominator. While there is substantial 172  Michael J. Boskin 
Table 5.2  Sectoral Saving Rates (% of GNP) 
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Source: Author’s calculations from National Balance Sheers, Board of Governors of the Federal 
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Table 5.3  Sectoral Average Saving Rates (% of GNP) 
Years  private  Public  National 
1951-60  12.2  -.l  12.0 
1961-70  9.0  -.l  8.9 
1971-80  12.8  .o  12.8 
1981-87  6.5  -3.3  3.2 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
year-to-year variation in  both  the private and  national growth rates of  net 
worth, it is clear that the rate of growth of real net worth in the U.S. economy 
has slowed substantially in the period 1979-87 relative to any other extended 
subperiod since World War 11. 
Perhaps the most serious omission from these measures of net worth is that 
they reflect only nonhuman capital. The capitalized value of expected future 
earnings, human wealth, is not included. There have been many attempts to 
estimate measures of  human wealth, and/or to incorporate them in analyses of 
consumption and saving behavior (see, e.g., Boskin and Lau 1988; Jorgenson 
and Fraumeni 1989). There are many difficulties in obtaining such estimates, 
including capitalization rates, the appropriate expected earnings process for 
forecasts,  questions of  differential risk,  discounting, liquidity,  bequeath- 
ability, and so on. Roughly speaking, about three-quarters of national income 
is a return to labor; ignoring all these differences would suggest that about 
three-quarters of  total wealth would be human wealth. Of  course, mortality, 
disability, and similar probabilities must be added to discount rates on future 
earnings; among other concerns, there  is  differential taxation of  different 
sources and uses of income (although these have declined with the new  tax 
law). Human wealth must be estimated in more indirect ways than many com- 
ponents of  nonhuman wealth whose asset values can be  determined via the 
market. 
Finally, in discussing definitions, measures, and data needs, it is important 
to realize that the economy changes. The pace at which we want to augment 
or update measures of saving and wealth, or reclassify items, and so on, de- 
pends heavily upon the purpose in generating the data in the first place. 
5.3  Aggregation and Disaggregation 
Discussed above was the issue of  whether to combine the household and 
corporate sectors following Denison’s law, as enunciated and reconfirmed (as 
of that time) by David and Scadding (1974) or, at the other extreme, whether 
to separate household and business saving because of credit rationing. Addi- 
tional distinctions might be  drawn on the type of  assets and  liabilities, for 
example, their liquidity properties, fixed costs in shifting in and out of them, 
their duration, and so forth. I might also mention that a strong Ricardian 174  Michael J. Boskin 
Table 5.4  Net Worth in Billions of  1982 Dollars 
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Source:  Author’s calculations from National Balance Sheers, Board  of  Governors of  Federal 
Reserve. 
might aggregate all resources, ignoring their age distribution, and, depending 
upon the view of the substitutability of public and private capital, might even 
aggregate private  and public saving, and  focus only on national saving, as 
changes in public saving or dissaving might be exactly offset according to the 
theory by private saving. 175  Issues in the Measurement and Interpretation of Saving and Wealth 
Table 5.5  Rate of Growth of Net Worth (percentage points) 










































4.2  7.1 
6.3  6.7 
1.8  4.4 
2.8  5.0 
4.3  4.7 
3.5  3.5 
4.3  4.3 
5.6  6.7 
4.3  5.6 
1.8  2.4 
2.5  2.1 
2.9  3.2 
2.0  2.5 
2.6  2.5 
2.5  2.6 
1.6  2.0 
4.0  4.4 
3.4  4.0 
4.5  5.3 
3.0  3.0 
3.8  4.3 
1.6  2.4 
.8  .9 
4.4  4.2 
5.2  5.7 
3.5  4.7 
3.7  4.7 
2.7  1.9 
5.8  5.8 
5.6  6.1 
5.7  6.4 
.7  1.4 
.7  .8 
2.5  2.6 
.1.4  -  2.7 
3.0  1.9 
2.0  1.2 
.5  -  .6 
4.6  3.7 
1.7  1.1 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
The purpose of this section is to highlight two other issues of  aggregation. 
First, within the household sector there have been tremendous changes in 
household formation, dissolution, the age structure of  households, average 
household  size,  life  expectancy, and  household composition. Particularly 
when we begin to analyze consumer durables, the value of housing, and life- 
cycle or age-specific balance sheet data, it is important to keep these changes 176  Michael J. Boskin 
in mind. For example, Boskin and Lau (1988) document that slightly more 
than half of the average annual percentage increase in real consumption in the 
period  1950-80  was due to the growth in  the number of households as op- 
posed to the annual percentage increase in real consumption per household. 
Thus, one might wish to decompose changes in the aggregate saving rate 
into the sum of the rates of change per household and the rate of change in the 
number of households. We know, for example, that in equation (1) 
Sr = CC. sijt  9 
ij 
where we index households of type  i, age j in year t. The households might 
differ by  size,  asset values, net worth, or access to credit markets, family 
composition, and so forth; age may be important for life cycle or other rea- 
sons. We  know from survey data that some households are saving and others 
dissaving and that the aggregate saving rate is the sum of these household- 
specific saving rates.  Probing a little deeper, changes in saving caused, for 
example, by changes in an exogenous (to the household) variable z, we note 
that the elasticity of aggregate saving with respect to z is a weighted average 
of the percentage changes of the saving of the different household types with 
respect  to  the given percentage change of  the variable for them,  with  the 
weights being the share (possibly negative) of aggregate saving accounted for 
by that type or, mathematically, 
where Nor  refers to the number of households of type i and agej  in year t and 
S,  to the saving or dissaving of a household of type i, age j,  in year t. 
Thus, analyses of aggregate saving must come to grips with the problems 
of  aggregation to the extent that households are heterogeneous (see Jorgen- 
son,  Lau,  and Stoker  1982; and Boskin and  Lau  1988). Quite apart from 
Lucas-type critiques, analyses of the effects of various variables on aggregate 
saving may be quite misleading if  the shares of  saving, or of  income and 
wealth, held by households of different types and ages change through time. 
We  know, for example, there have been tremendous changes in the age distri- 
bution of income in the United States (see, e.g., Boskin, Kotlikoff and Knetter 
1985). Perhaps the most important aspect of this change has been the tremen- 
dous increase in the relative economic well-being of the elderly, which some 
theories of saving suggest should be dissaving during retirement. 
5.4  Some Specific Issues 
The NIPA treat expenditures on consumer durables as consumption rather 
than as saving. Many have argued (and I have generally been sympathetic to 177  Issues in the Measurement and Interpretation of Saving and Wealth 
the argument) that it would be preferable to treat expenditures on consumer 
durables and the imputed rental flow of the durables as consumption (see Da- 
vid and Scadding 1974; Boskin, Robinson, and Huber 1989; Holloway 1989; 
and Hendershott and Peek 1989, among others). Recall that estimates of  the 
value of  consumer durables are included conceptually in the Flow of  Funds 
estimates. Various issues arise in valuing the services of consumer durables 
(Katz 1983). In table 5.6 I present NIPA  saving rates augmented to include 
consumer durables for a few years. Note that this adds about 5  percentage 
points to the NIPA estimate of  gross saving. Of  course, as mentioned in the 
introduction, it would also be included on the investment side and does noth- 
ing for the shortfall of our domestic saving relative to our investment. U.S. 
citizens invest much more in consumer durables than persons in other soci- 
eties. This undoubtedly reflects a number of  factors, including the size of 
homes.  The difference is  particularly  important  relative to  Japan,  where 
the durables adjustment closes the saving rate differential substantially (see 
table  5.6  for  some  comparisons  with  Japan,  including  durables  adjust- 
Table 5.6  Augmented Saving Rates, United States and Japan, Selected Years,. 
Exclude  Include Government 
Government  Nonmilitary  Include Government 
Nonmilitary  Investment in Fixed  Nonmilitary  All Govern- 
Investment  Reproducible  Investment in Fixed  ment Investment 
(NIPA  Capital (OECD  Reproducible Capital &  & Consumer 
Basis)  Basis)  Consumer Durables  Durables 
U.S. Gross Saving 
Rates (Gross Na- 
tional SavingGNP): 
1950  17.8  20.3  24.7  23.9 
1960  15.0  18.3  21.9  22.9 
1970  13.8  16.8  21.3  21.8 
1980  16.4  18.1  23.2  24.0 
1985  13.8  15.5  22.2  24.3 
U.S. Net Saving 
Rates (Net National 
Saving/NNP): 
1950  11.7  13.2  14.6  11.8 
1960  8.2  10.6  10.9  11.1 
1970  6.2  8.2  8.8  8.7 
1980  7.7  8.5  8.7  9.2 
1985  4.7  5.5  7.0  8.8 
Saving Rates: 
1970  22.8  30.9  31.6  31.7 
1975  14.7  22.6  23.1  23.2 
1980  13.2  21.1  21.6  21.7 
1984  14.4  19.8  20.2  20.4 
Japanese Net 
Sources: United States: Boskin, Robinson, and Huber (1989); Japan: Boskin and Roberts (1986). 
ONP  and NNP augmented to include corresponding rental flows. 178  Michael J. Boskin 
ments and also government capital). It might well be useful for the BEA to sup- 
plement (not replace) the current saving data with  such estimates for dur- 
ables . 
Government tangible capital, as well as contingent and potential liabilities, 
are also of potential importance. Governments in all countries own, use, and 
provide services from capital. Differences in the rates of  growth of  public 
capital and differences in levels across societies can lead to misconceptions 
about aggregate national well-being and aggregate saving rates. Of  course, 
government saving and investment do not pass the same kind of market tests 
as private saving and investment. In Boskin, Robinson, and Huber (1989), 
new  estimates of  government saving, capital formation, and wealth for the 
United States in the period  1947-85  are estimated. Table 5.6 includes esti- 
mates of NIPA saving figures augmented to include net government saving in 
the form of nonmilitary capital and total capital. Again, the saving rate rises 
several percentage points, but recall that government capital depreciates and 
that our ability to estimate that depreciation is subject to even more difficul- 
ties than our ability to estimate the depreciation of  private tangible assets. 
The comparison with Japan is instructive, since, as a percentage of  GNP, 
government military capital formation in the United States is substantially 
larger, but total government capital formation is substantially smaller, than in 
Japan. 
Revaluations  of  assets and  liabilities are  presumably  captured approxi- 
mately by  market values and represented in the Flow of Funds. Obviously, 
they do not do so precisely. Estimated revaluations of tangible capital for the 
NIPA estimates would be adjusted upward, reflecting generally positive real 
revaluations. These are caused by  a variety of  factors, but especially by  the 
decline in investment goods prices relative to the overall price level. Revalua- 
tions of  financial assets and liabilities other than general real  interest rate 
changes should net internally as one household’s capital gain is another’s cap- 
ital loss or, conversely, between the public and private sectors. Of course, a 
general mood of pessimism or optimism tending to change the rate at which 
future incomes are discounted could cause a substantial overall revaluation. 
Further, to the extent that there are foreign holdings by Americans and hold- 
ings of  U.S.  assets by  foreigners, the real revaluations will not necessarily 
cancel for the United States as a whole. Indeed, the saving abroad by U.S. 
citizens is quite difficult to measure. 
I noted in the introduction and in section 5.2 that the measurement of in- 
come was undoubtedly a major issue in the measurement of  saving. Under- 
reporting and measurement errors play a role and are likely to change system- 
atically over time. The measurement of  real income is even more difficult. 
Distortions caused by inflation create difficulties in computing changes in real 
corporate balance sheets, as well as other components of income. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to go into detail here, but not only is the measurement 
of real income tremendously difficult and important (especially for corporate 179  Issues in the Measurement and Interpretation of Saving and  Wealth 
profits) but an appropriate real cost-of-living index would include the price of 
future consumption in it, and this obviously varies with the ex ante expected 
real net (of taxes) rate of return, which has varied over time. 
Human capital, whether in education, health, nutrition, and so on, has been 
discussed very briefly above. Clearly, the United States spends a much larger 
fraction of its GNP on education than most other societies. This is especially 
true for higher education. Difficulties of comparability, however, abound. It is 
alleged, for example, that students in the United Kingdom or Japan are much 
further along when they finish high school than are U.S.  students. A distinc- 
tion between investment and consumption in educational expenditures is not 
easy to draw empirically. Estimates of the rate of return must rely on some 
estimate of the amount of such investment, and thus a certain amount of indi- 
rection is necessary in obtaining estimates. Despite improvements in correct- 
ing for sample selection bias, among other procedures, we are still some dis- 
tance from estimating gross investment and saving in human capital. Some 
estimates (e.g., Kendrick 1976) place the amount of human capital investment 
at approximately the same level as nonhuman investment in the economy. Es- 
timating net saving and investment in human capital is even more difficult. At 
what rate do knowledge and skill acquired in education, or on the job, depre- 
ciate or become obsolete? Clearly, unlike financial assets or tangible non- 
human capital, they cannot be bequeathed, although they may be an input into 
human investment in  one’s children. Again, I refer the interested reader to 
Jorgenson and  Fraumeni (1989), and, perhaps just  as important, Rosen’s 
(1989) discussion, to gain a feel for some of  the issues involved. 
The appropriate treatment of private pensions in saving statistics  is a subject 
of much dispute. Currently, for example, employer contributions of defined- 
benefit pension plans show up in the private saving statistics. Some have ar- 
gued for a concept of pension wealth, that is, the expected present value of 
future pension payments. An analogous argument has been made for Social 
Security. It is not my purpose to review here the voluminous literature of the 
potential impact of Social Security wealth on real economic activity, such as 
saving choices, or the analogous literature on private or state and local and 
other government partially funded liabilities. At various points in history, cur- 
rently unfunded liabilities have been large, subject to substantial variation de- 
pending upon assumed patterns of  economic and demographic trends, and 
subject to enormous change through minor changes in the rules relating to 
benefit calculations or taxes. Further, Social Security has begun a systematic 
move away from pay-as-you-go finance toward building a historically large 
How to define the expected obligations of the Social Security system, for 
example, is also open to much controversy. Under a closed group approach, 
the expected future taxes and benefits paid  by  particular cohorts-for  ex- 
ample, all those alive or all those currently above a certain age, such as 18- 
would be calculated, discounted to the present, and compared. The difference 
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between the expected present value of benefits and taxes would be the surplus 
or deficit. This concept, using current participants as a group, is adopted by 
Arthur Anderson & Co (1986). Such an estimate would add $100 billion or 
more per year to the federal government deficit. Likewise, to the extent there 
were accruing unfunded liabilities in state and local government or private 
pension funds, these would need to be netted out (to the extent that they were 
not netted explicitly or via market valuation of corporate equities in Flow of 
Funds or other data). Recall that the state and local surplus in recent years has 
been over 1% of  GNP, but that much of  it is in  pension funds, whose sim- 
ultaneously accruing liabilities are not included in the national saving statis- 
tics. 
Under an open group concept, the expected present value of  benefits and 
taxes paid over some time period, often taken to be 75-year actuarial projec- 
tion period of  the Social Security Administration, would be compared, with 
the difference being the surplus or deficit. Thus, taxes paid in the early work- 
ing years of the currently unborn and benefits paid to persons during retire- 
ment who are not yet in the labor force would be counted. Social Security in 
the United States, as well as similar programs in most other advanced econo- 
mies, has become so large and contains so many features, including insurance 
features, it may well affect private saving behavior. I believe the best we can 
do is provide some supplemental information to the traditional NIPA  treat- 
ment of Social Security in the budget, simply netting the excess of taxes over 
outlays as positive government saving, currently offsetting the larger deficit in 
that part of the budget not including Social Security. The substantial unfunded 
liabilities I have dealt  with  elsewhere (see Boskin,  Robinson, and  Huber 
1989). 
I do not think it is sensible to include OASI contributions as part of personal 
saving, as suggested by Hendershott and Peek (1989). This would double the 
net private saving rate, but while it is true that some individuals believe that 
their contributions are a sort of saving, legally and by nature of the formulae 
in use at any point in time,  there is no necessary  relationship between an 
individual’s marginal contribution and their own marginal returns. Of course, 
for the nation as whole, the aggregate saving is captured by the difference in 
the cash flow in the system plus (by no means easy to estimate) the change in 
expected real net accrued liabilities. For those interested in the relationship of 
marginal Social Security taxes paid and expected marginal benefits for house- 
holds of different income levels, family type and ages, see Boskin, Kotlikoff, 
Puffert, and Shoven (1987). 
I do not have the space to go into contingent liabilities by  sector, such as 
those generated in the thrift industry or pension plans. The nature of deposit 
and pension insurance is to provide a put option and create a heads-I-win- 
tails-the-taxpayer-loses type situation, which may encourage excessive risk 
taking. I have dealt with these issues in the context of  a more appropriate 
budgetary treatment elsewhere (Boskin, Barham, Cone, and Ozler 1987). 181  Issues in the Measurement and Interpretation of Saving and Wealth 
5.5  Conclusion 
My  conclusion is quite simple. We  have come some way  toward under- 
standing, measuring, interpreting, and analyzing saving and wealth. While 
there is a substantial need for continued research into analyzing saving be- 
havior  and  wealth  accumulation,  the  following  conclusions deserve em- 
phasis. 
1. While the United States has a saving rate that is low by historical and 
international standards, that  saving rate  is  substantially higher when  more 
comprehensive measures of saving are developed. While there are substantial 
difficulties in developing such augmented measures of national saving, vari- 
ous data sources and estimation methodologies all conclude that adjustments 
for net saving in durables, government capital, capital gains and losses, reval- 
uations, and so on, are substantial. 
2. The adjustments for durables and government capital are likely to narrow 
the saving-rate gap between the United States and Japan, and to a lesser extent 
between the United States and the European economies. This reduction in the 
saving-rate gap is much greater for gross saving than net saving. 
3. No one saving-rate measure is the answer to all questions one might pose 
about saving and wealth accumulation. Often there will be offsetting tenden- 
cies by sector, asset type, and so on. A decrease in the traditional NIPA saving 
figures may reflect a rise in the stock market, which may  decrease saving 
either because of direct adjustment on the part of households or mechanical 
adjustments due to the actuarial formulae for pension plans. 
4.  The reasonable, even permissible, level of aggregation, across types of 
households, ages of households, sectors of the economy, and types of assets 
and liabilities, depends heavily upon one’s beliefs concerning an appropriate 
model of the economy (e.g., of credit markets in deciding whether to combine 
household  and  corporate  saving,  and  of  household  behavior  in  deciding 
whether to analyze private saving and government saving separately from na- 
tional saving). 
5. Innumerable technical issues remain, ranging from appropriate deflators 
to valuation in nonmarket situations. While these often revolve around tech- 
nical issues, they also involve components of saving and of wealth that can be 
large relative to the more traditional components, for example, Social Secu- 
rity, the contingent liabilities of the banking system, and so on. The remark- 
able change in the U.S. net international lending position in recent years sug- 
gests that the traditional argument that most capital gains and losses, and 
revaluations, will net internally is no longer accurate. 
6. Perhaps the most important measurement issue for traditional saving es- 
timates is improving the measures of  personal income to include as much 
unrecorded income as plausible. 
7. Supplementing the aggregate data with age-cohort-specific data may be 
of great value. 182  Michael J. Boskin 
Many  of these issues were  addressed for the  economy as a whole or for 
important subsectors of the economy, and important subsets of these issues, 
at the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth reported in Lipsey and 
Tice (1989). I have no doubt whatsoever that when future generations of econ- 
omists celebrate  subsequent major  anniversaries of the  Conference  on  Re- 
search in Income and Wealth, they will bear witness to considerable additional 
value added in measuring, interpreting, and analyzing saving and wealth. 
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